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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Guy Coulston was charged with and ultimately convicted of lewd conduct of a 
minor under sixteen. Prior to trial, Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress statements 
made during an interrogation by Deputy Oyler where Mr. Coulston informed the officer 
that he had "better talk to an attorney." Despite Mr. Coulston's unequivocal request, the 
interrogating officer continued to question him. On appeal, Mr. Coulston contends that 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements in violation of Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Guy Coulston is a single father to three female children. (Tr., p.782, Ls.18-23.) 
The two youngest children are Mr. Coulston's biological daughters with his ex-wife 
Millicent Coulston. (Tr., p.783, Ls.4-20.) The oldest child, A.M., is Millicent's child from 
another relationship. (Tr., p.782, L.18 - p.783, L.23.) After a number of years of 
marriage, Mr. Coulston on Millicent divorced and Millicent took the children. (Tr., p.783, 
L.23 - p. 784, L.24.) After approximately two years, Mr. Coulston obtained custody of all 
three girls when Millicent "really got into drugs and lost herself. (Tr., p.784, L.21 -
p.785, L.18.) Thereafter, Mr. Coulston raised the three girls as a single father. 
(Tr., p.785, L.19-p.787, L.3.) 
On November 29, 2011, Mr. Coulston received a call from his babysitter who 
stated that his two youngest daughters did not get off the bus after school, so 
Mr. Coulston was frantically looking for them. (Tr., p.807, L.25 - p.808, L.4, p.841, 
Ls.18-25.) Unbeknownst to Mr. Coulston, A.M. had met with the school counselor 
because she was mad at Mr. Coulston after he told her she could not go to her 
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afterschool activities. (Tr., p.313, Ls.1-7.) A.M. told the counselor and eventually law 
enforcement that Mr. Coulston had been having sexual intercourse with her. (See 
Tr., p.303, L.1 - 371, L.24.) Mr. Coulston then received a pretext call "from A.M." 
(Tr., p.219, L.10 - p.220, L.12.) VVhile it was A.M.'s voice on the phone, Officer Oyler 
was telling A.M. what to say to Mr. Coulston. (Tr., p.269, L.9 - p.273, L.1.) After the 
call, Officer Oyler contacted Mr. Coulston and Mr. Coulston went to the police station to 
meet with Oyler. (Tr., p.222, L.9 - p.223, L.9.) After approximately an hour of 
questioning, Mr. Coulston was arrested. ( See Exhibit B.) 
Mr. Coulston was charged by Information with lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen. (R., pp.74-75.) Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all 
statements made after he invoked his right to counsel must be suppressed of a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (R., pp.83-84.) The State 
filed an opposing brief and the district court held a hearing. (R., pp.92-99.) The district 
court held that Mr. Coulston's request for an attorney was "ambiguous" and denied his 
Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p.29, L.10 - p.33, L.5; R., p.315.) Mr. Coulston proceeded to 
trial and during the second day of deliberation, was found guilty of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. (R., pp.248-252, 286.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, upon Mr. Coulston. (R., pp.298-300.) 
Mr. Coulston filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.306-308.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress statements made 
during an interrogation where Mr. Coulston's unequivocally requested an attorney? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denyin Mr. Coulston's Motion To Suppress Statements 
Made During An Interrogation Where Deputy Oyler Failed To Honor Mr. Cou!ston's 
Unequivocal Request For An Attorney 
A. Introduction 
After a little under 30 minutes of interrogation, Mr. Coulston paused, took a deep 
breath and told the interrogating officer, "Ya know, guess from here on out, I know you 
guys got your things and, better talk to an attorney. I have no idea." Despite 
Mr. Coulston's unequivocal request for an attorney, Officer Oyler pressed further and 
continued to question Mr. Coulston. Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress statements 
made after his unequivocal invocation of counsel, which was denied by the district court. 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress, and as a result, 
his case should be remanded back for a new trial. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which 
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 
(Ct. App. 1996). Mr. Coulston does not take issue with the district court's factual 
findings in this case, only its legal conclusion. 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Coulston's Motion To Suppress 
Statements Made During An Interrogation Where Deputy Oyler Failed To Honor 
Mr. Coulston's Unequivocal Request For An Attorney 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a 
defendant has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST AMEND 
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V. A defendant's Fifth Amendment rights must be explained to him before custodial 
interrogation may begin. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to 
Miranda: 
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to 
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. 
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and 
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his 
right of silence and to assure the exercise of the right will be scrupulously 
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior 
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he 
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will 
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 464. Miranda safeguards must "come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Interrogation is therefore defined as "any words or 
actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301. Once a defendant 
unambiguously invokes his right to counsel request for counsel, it must be scrupulously 
honored, and interrogation may not resume until an attorney is present or the suspect 
himself reinitiates the conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981 ); See 
also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). If the right to counsel has been 
invoked, the police may not reinitiate interrogation of the detainee in the absence of an 
attorney. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1990); State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 
354, 360 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
1. Mr. Coulston Was In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda 
The requirement of Miranda warnings is operative whenever a person is 
interrogated while they are in "custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
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any significant way." Miranda, 384 at 444 (emphasis added); State v. Doe, 130 idaho 
811, 814, 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997). If a person is not Mirandized before 
answering a question in a custodial interrogation, the statement is inadmissible. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492-94. 
A person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda requirement ·...vhen there is a 
formal arrest, or when there is a restraint on the freedom of a person's movement to 
such a degree that is associated with a formal arrest, or that person's freedom of action 
is significantiy deprived. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); State v. 
Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 399 (1997). In determining whether a person is in custody, the 
relevant question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
understood his situation. State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591 (Ct. App. 1999). "The 
totality of the circumstances must be examined, which may include the location of the 
interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, the 
time of the interrogation, and other persons present." Id. ( citing State v. Medrano, 123 
Idaho 114, 117-118 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
In the instant case, the State conceded that Mr. Coulston was in custody by 
failing to object to Mr. Coulston's custodial status. In addition, the district court implicitly 
found that Mr. Coulston was in custody at the time at the time of his request for counsel 
by deciding whether Mr. Coulston's request for counsel was unequivocal. In fact, 
Mr. Coulston, after driving himself to the station, was ushered into a room where his 
chair was in the back corner away from the door. (See Exhibit B.) Officer Ohler 
entered, took a chair in front of Mr. Coulston, and shut the door of the small room. (See 
Exhibit B.) Mr. Coulston was informed that he was not "under arrest" but was then read 
his Miranda rights. (See Exhibit 8.) Mr. Coulston was also given a copy of 
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documentation that his children had been sheltered. (See Exhibit B.) It is apparent, as 
both the district court and prosecutor recognized that Mr. Coulston was in custody 
during the questioning by Officer Oyler. 
2. Mr. Coulston Was ''Interrogated" For Purposes Of Miranda 
1'11iranda safeguards must "come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). In Innis, the United States Supreme Court further 
defined what it meant by the term "interrogation," stating: 
[w]e conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a 
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning, or its 
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the poiice (other than those normal attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this 
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather 
than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda 
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added 
measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to 
objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the 
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response 
from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely 
cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable result of their words or 
actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions 
on the part of police officers that he should have known were reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-302 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Again, whether Mr. Coulston was subjected to express questioning was not 
addressed by any party or the court below. As such, in order to reach the question of 
whether a request was made, the district would have had to conclude that Mr. Coulston 
was subjected to express questioning. This, of course, is consistent with any view of 
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the interrogation in question where Officer Oyler was asking questions with the intent of 
gaining an incriminating response. (See generally Exhibit 8.) 
3. Mr. Coulston Unequivocally Requested Counsel 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court indicated that a police interrogation 
must terminate when a person in custody indicates "in any manner" that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. In Davis, the Court required 
more than a simple request, but an unequivocal request by the detainee. 512 U.S. at 
459. The Davis Court explained the objective standard that applies in the detainee: 
must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the 
requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop 
questioning the suspect. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4 
(1986) ("[T]he interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only [i]f 
the individual states that he wants an attorney"). 
Id. With regard to ambiguous requests, Davis decision observes: 
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it 
will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify 
whether or not he actually wants an attorney .... Clarifying questions help 
protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he 
wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being 
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the 
meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel. But we decline to 
adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's 
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the 
officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. 
Id. at 460. In reaching its decision, the Davis Court held that the defendant's statement 
in that case, "Maybe I should talk to an attorney," was not an unequivocal request for 
counsel that obligated the officers to stop the interrogation. Id. 
After a little almost 28 minutes of questioning from Officer Oyler, the following 
colloquy occurred: 
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Oyler: ... Sounds like [A.M.] plays the role of the wife and mother. And I 
can understand wires can get crossed on that, ya know? She acts 
older than her age, kinda like a pseudo-wife, so to speak. You 
haven't been able to have a decent relationship because you've 
sacrificed for these kids. And you're a man, you need some 
release every now and then. 
Coulston: I've got my person for release. 
Oyler: Your person? 
Coulston: Yeah, (inaudible) I am a man I do need something. 
Olyer: So you got a friend for that? 
Coulston: Yeah, when the kids ain't around. Other than that my hand works 
just fine. 
Oyler: Well, it would make sense, whether you intend it or not, that some 
lines can be crossed with [A.M.]. She's a cute little thing. 
Coulston: Oh yeah, I keep her well under ... 
Oyler: I'd imagine she's got some boys chasin after her. 








So this is where we're at with it. 
No, I'm not. No. Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys 
got your things, better talk to an attorney. I have no idea. 
[Ohler takes deep breath, leans forward and moves his chair closer 
to Coulston] 
Let me ask you this Guy, cause like I said you seem to be a straight 
shooter. What are we going to do, right now [A.M.] is getting a 
sexual assault exam and uh, we find your sperm inside her from 
Sunday night. 
[No response] 
That is what it is. Proof positive and you know we are going to find 
it. 
(Exhibit Bat 26:50-30:00.) 
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It is abundantly apparent, based on any view of the video of the interrogation in 
this case that Mr. Coulston unequivocally requested an attorney and Officer Oyler flat 
out ignored his request and pressed even harder for an incriminatory statement. The 
moment Officer Oyler began accusing Mr. Coulston of inappropriate conduct with A.M.; 
Mr. Coulston paused, took a deep breath and said "Sad." When Officer Oyler pressed 
further, saying, "So this is where we're at with it," Mr. Coulston responded with, "No, I'm 
not[,] [n]o." Mr. Coulston then stated, "Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys 
got your things; better talk to an attorney." There is nothing unequivocal about 
Mr. Coulston's request, he stated, based upon the accusations ("I know you guys got 
your things") he had "better talk to an attorney." Any other conclusion ignores the 
totality of the interrogation, Mr. Coulston's body language, and the circumstances at the 
time he made his unequivocal request. 
Further, it is apparent that Officer Oyler recognized the request for counsel as the 
moment Mr. Coulston asked to talk to an attorney: Oyler paused, took a deep breath, 
leaned forward, and scooted his chair closer to Mr. Coulston. Rather than even 
acknowledging Mr. Coulston's request for counsel, Oyler pressed even harder for an 
incriminatory statement. Officer Oyler moved from asking questions and insinuating 
inappropriate conduct, to telling Mr. Coulston what they would find from A.M.'s sexual 
assault examination. 
It is also important to compare Oyler's demeanor and reaction the first time 
Mr. Coulston invoked counsel when no incriminatory statements had yet been made, 
with Oyler's response to Mr. Coulston's second invocation, after purported incriminatory 
statements had been made. During Mr. Coulston's first invocation, Oyler ignored the 
request and pressed harder for a confession of sorts. (Exhibit B at 28:00-30:00.) The 
10 
second time Mr. Coulston invoked his right to counsel, he stated: ''Do I still get to speak 
to an attorney." (Exhibit Bat 59:55.) At this point in the interrogation, Oyler had already 
gotten what he wanted out of his questioning and was in the process of obtaining DNA 
samples from Mr. Coulston, Oyler replied, "Yeah, you can get an attorney anytime you 
want to." (Exhibit 8 at 59:59.) Officer Oyler's responses to the Mr. Coulston's 
invocations of counsel, based upon when they occurred in the interrogation, are 
evidence of his intentional avoidance and ignorance of Mr. Coulston's Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel. 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the district court erred in denying 
Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of Mr. Coulston's 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Coulston respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
denial of his suppression motion, vacate his conviction, and remand his case for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2014. 
ER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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